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Activity in the housing market traditionally has been
very sensitive to changes in interest rates. This sensitivity
has hadimportant implications bothforparticipants in the
housing industry and monetary policy. Theory suggests,
however, that financial innovation and deregulation in
recent years may have altered the link between housing
and interest rates. In this paper, the theoretical linkages
are discussed and studied empirically for the periods
before and after 1983. A significant difference in the
strength and nature ofthe linkages is revealed.
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The housing market historically has displayed pro-
nounced cycles in investment activity. In the last 30 years,
for example, the variation in the volume of new housing
starts has been Biz times greater than the variation in GNP
over the same period. 1 Economists and central bankers
long have been interested in understanding these fluctua-
tions for several reasons. First, the cycles in housing
activity empirically have been useful leading indicators of
the general business cycle. In most recessions, residential
fixed investment appears to have led both declines in
business investment and GNP. 2 Its perceived value as a
leading indicator has made understanding housing cycles
important to economic forecasters.
Second, understanding investment behaviorin the econ-
omy is important for understanding aggregate economic
volatility. Investment spending is the most volatile compo-
nent ofaggregate demand, and spending on new home and
apartment.construction (residential fixed investment) is
the mostvolatile componentoftotal investment spending. 3
Thus, although residential investment is a smaller propor-
tion of GNP than business fixed investment, its volatility
has a particularly important influence on the volatility in
national income over time.
Finally, because housing activity apparently has been
sensitive to changes in interest rates, the housing sector
historically has been an important channel through which
monetary policy has influenced economic activity. In fact,
there is some evidence that the economy may react more
quickly to shocks that make their way through the housing
component ofaggregate demandthan through the business
fixed investment component.4 Thus, when monetary au-
thorities have decided to slow the national economy to
bring inflation down, they typically have used monetary
restrainttoraise interestrates, which tended to contractthe
housing sector, and in this way, they were able to effect the
desired cooling of the overall economy. 5
A key linkage in this process, of course, has been the
relationship between housing activity and the level of
interest rates. Historically there does appear, indeed, to
have been a strong, inverse relationship between disturb-
ances to interest rates and changes in housing starts. In
3recent years, however, the relationship between housing
and disturbances in interest rates appears to have become
less regular. (See Chart 1.)
This article explores the changes in the relationship
between interest rates and housing, and tries to examine
the potential causes of this changed relationship. The
extensive financial innovation and reform that occurred in
banking and mortgage markets in the early 1980s changed
the way in which housing lenders raised their funds, and
changed the types ofmortgage instruments that were made
available to homeowners. The empirical evidence pre-
sented in this paper suggests that the relationship between
housing starts and interest rates changed significantly in
the period after deregulation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section I, the various theoretical links between in-
terest rates and housing are presented, and in Section II,
the influence of financial reform on these links is hy-
pothesized. As we shall see, there are numerous potential
channels by which housing may have been affected by
financialinnovation and regulatory reform. In Section III,
the relationships between interest rates and housing and
between funds flows and interest rates are examined em-
pirically. The data reveal that, in fact, a significant change
in these relationships has occurred.
The article concludes (in Section IV) with adiscussion
ofthe policy implications ofthese findings. These implica-
tions relate both to the effects ofthe changes on monetary
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(1) H* = H*(U, W, D)
where
I. Interest Rates and Housing: Channels ofInfluence
Because of the intimacy of the relationship between AUser Cost Model ofHousing Investment
housing a~d national.income, itis important to understand In this model, housing investment is a function of
the behavIOr of. h~usmg cycles, p~tlcularly as the~ relate housing demand and a (lagged) supply process. Housing
to movements m mterest rates, smce t~e level of mterest demand, or the desired stock of housing (H*), is deter-
rat~s generally has ~een the ~ontrol vanable. for m?netary mined by the periodic costs of owning a unit of housing,
polIcy. In thIs sectIOn, I dISCUSS the vanous lInkages that is the user cost of housing and demographic factors:
between housing investment demand and the interestrate' ,
that likely operated during the period prior to the recent
financial reforms. To do so, I posit a simple model of
housing investment.
4 Economic Review / Summer 1990Channell: Simple U~er Cost Effects
In the simple user cost model presented above, the
interest rate is the key component ofuser costs, revealing a
directchannelofinfluenceofinterestrates on housing. The
precise effects of a change in interest rates depends,
however, on whether the changes in interestchanges occur
becauseofchanges in the underlying real rate orchanges in
inflation expectations.
Specifically, the effect on housing is unambiguous when
a rise in the real interest rate occurs. As the rate, r, in
Equation (3) rises, the user cost rises and depresses stock
demand. This, in tum, results in depressed net new invest-
ment (manifested in reduced housing starts, for example),
and possibly depressed real housing prices, depending on
the elasticity of the housing supply response.
On the other hand, the effect of an increase in interest
rates associated solely with an increase in inflation expec-
tations is less clear. Equation (3) implies that ifthe tax rates
on normal income and capital gains are the same, an equal
increase in general and housing price inflation expecta-
tions would have no effecton housing demand. If, however,
the capital gains tax rate is effectively lower than the
normal tax rate (the case in the U.S.6), then anincrease in
inflation expectations can actually lower the user cost of
housing capital because the higher interest costs are more
than offset by the expected after-tax gain in the value ofthe
housing assets. If the user cost is lower, then the demand
for the housing stock increases, and with it, the price of
housing and/or investment.
where
s an adjustment weight or function
and the actual housing stock will adjust toward the desired
stock at aspeed that depends upon the nature ofthe supply
adjustment process, s. In markets in which the supply
process is elastic, the adjustment in the housing stock will
take place primarily through investment or disinvestment;
less elastic supply conditions will result primarily in price
adjustments to bring the desired and actual stocks into
balance.
The Effects of Interest Rate Changes
We can now discuss the ways that interest rates affect
housing investment. We begin first by discussing the
channels of influence revealed by the simple user cost
model described above. As we will see, however, in the
period prior to recent financial market reforms, institu-





= various demographic factors, such as population,
household formation behavior, etc.
I = s(H* - H),
The user cost of housing capital (or, sometimes more
ambiguously, the rental price) represents all current, out-
of-pocketcosts andnet foregone income that are associated
withowning ahome. Amajorcomponentofthe usercostis
the interest cost associated with an investment in housing.
In addition, costs are affected by (economic) depreciation
ofthe structure, maintenance expenditures, and expected
changes in the market price ofthe housing unit. Tnis latter
component, of course, can reduce or increase user costs
depending on whether inflation or deflation in the market
price of the unit is expected. Tax policy also affects user
costs through the treatment of both interest expenses and
capital gains in the tax code.
The relationship between the user cost, V, of a unit of
housing, the real interest rate, r, and the other components
ofthe user cost can be stated more precisely as:
where
P = market price of the housing unit
t = marginal tax rate on normal income
c = marginal tax rate on capital gains
d = rate ofeconomic depreciation oftheunit perperiod
i = the nominal interest rate = (r + e)
h = expected house price inflation
r = real interest rate
e = rate of inflation expectations
or, equivalently, ifexpected house price inflation, h, equals
the expected rate of general price inflation, e,
U = P[(l-t) (r+e) - (l-c) (e) + d]
= P[(l-t)r - (t-c)e + d]. (3)
From Equation (3), it is clear that user costs increase
with the after-tax real interest rate, (1-t)r, and the rate of
depreciation, d. User costs decline with increases in
inflation expectations, e, as long as the tax treatment of
capital gains is favored (that is, as long as c< t).
Ifthe desired stock ofhousing equals the actual existing
stock at the prevailing user cost (that is, ifH* = H), then
no investment in housing will occur. More likely, however,
the desired stock is less than or greater than the actual, and
investment (I) will occur as:




Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 5In summary, the demand for housing is a function of
interest rates through their effect on the user cost of
housing. The link between housing and interest rates is a
negative one when the real interest rate changes and a
positive one when inflationexpectations change (assuming
that capital gains receive preferential tax treatment, as is
the case currently).
Channel 2: Credit Scoring and Affordability
A second channel by which interest rates potentially
have influenced housing is the so-called affordability con-
straint, which arises out of the loan qualification process.
This channel was aparticularsource ofconcern in the mid-
to late-1970s.Because state laws limit lenders' ability
to secure mortgage loans via the non-housing net worth
and/or future income of households, the current home
value and current income ofthe household play an impor-
tant role in credit scoring or loan qualification standards.
The standards usually are stated as limits on the ratio of
mortgage payment size to household income, among other
variables. To the extent that these standards do not change
(because of constraints on mortgage design, or sluggish
adjustmentofthe standarddue toregulation orconvention)
they can become an additional source ofinfluence for inter-
est rate shocks. Ifinterest rates rise abruptly, for example,
the effective supply of mortgage credit to borrowers-
under a fixed set of standards-can change abruptly
as well.7
The affordability effect can be viewed in the context of
the user cost model presented above as an additional factor
that implicitly augments the interest rate component of
user costs. To the extent that affordability constraints are
binding, therefore, affordability constraints have the effect
ofdepressing housing demand and lowering eitherhousing
investment activity or prices, or both.
To summarize, affordability considerations reinforce the
depressing effect of higher real interest rates on housing
investment and prices. Affordability considerations also
will offset, at least partially, any stimulative effects of
higher inflation expectations on housing investment. The
extent to which affordability considerations depress hous-
ing investmentandprices will depend upon the availability
ofameliorative mortgage designs.
Channel 3: Interest Rates and Disintermediation
A third channel through which interest rates may have
influenced housing investment is the phenomenon known
as "disintermediation." Disintermediation refers to the
tendency offunds to flow away from conventional housing
6
lenders (such as thrifts and banks) when interest rates rise
suddenly. Disintermediation occurred historically because
the conventional mortgage intermediaries faced restric-
tions on their ability to pay depositrates that were competi-
tive with open-market investment opportunities. Faced
with higher-yield opportunities elsewhere, consumers are
said to have moved their deposits out of financial inter-
mediaries, thereby reducing the funding available to con-
ventional housing lenders. To the extent that other sources
ofmortgagefunding were imperfect substitutes for finan-
cial intermediaries, the result was an increase in the cost of
mortgage funds.
Itis unlikely that the effects ofdisintermediation could
have persisted for long periods of time, however. After the
initial effects ofan increase in interest rates, investment in
mortgage debt by other lenders should have provided an
offsetting supply ofmortgage credit. For example, lending
by non-depository intermediaries (such as insurance com-
panies), issuance and sale of mortgage-backed securities
by banks and thrifts, and financing by home sellers most
likely increased to offset the decline in traditional mort-
gage intermediation.
In addition, even ifbanks and thrifts have beenrestricted
in their ability to compete via higher deposit rates, in the
long run, they were able to attract funds by increasing the
services offered their depositors. This non-pecuniary form
of competition eventually would have drawn some funds
back to the affected banks and thrifts.
This argument suggests that disintermediation, to the
extent it was influential, had primarily transient effects
related to sudden changes in the level ofinterest rates and
notto the level itself. The extentto which disintermediation
affected the supply of mortgage funds depends on a
number of factors, including the breadth and sophistica-
tion of the mortgage-backed securities market and the
speed with which the deposit rate regulations could be
circumvented by banks and thrifts. Disintermediation is
cited as a significant contributor to short-term housing
cycles in the 1960s and 1970s not only because deposit
regulations were binding at times during this period, but
also because the mortgage-backed securities market was
not yet highly developed.
From auser-cost perspective, the disintermediation phe-
nomenon would be manifested in price- or non-price
rationing ofmortgage funds thateffectively wouldraise the
interest cost component of housing user costs. The ex-
pected effect ofthis channel ofinfluence, therefore, would
be for higher interest rates (transiently, at least) to depress
housing demand, housing investment, and housing prices.
Economic Review / Summer 1990II. The Effects ofFinancial Change
Inthe early 1980s, majorchanges in the financial system
occurred that may have affected the functioning of these
various linkages. Legislativereforms andfinancial innova-
tion affected mortgage instrumentation, mortgage inter-
mediaries, and household mortgage demand.
A Changing Marketplace
There were both legislative and market changes in
the early 1980s that may have influenced the interest
rate/housing link. Two key pieces of legislation affect-
ing mortgage markets that were enacted in the early
1980s were particularly important. The first, the Deposi-
tory Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
(DIDMCA), was passed in 1980. Title II of this Act
provided for interest rate ceilings on time and saving
deposits at banks and thrifts to be phased out overasix year
period. Title III provided nationwide authorization of
interest-bearing transactions accounts as of January 1,
1981. These accounts were negotiated orderofwithdrawal,
or NOW, accounts with a regulated maximum rate.
Because depository institutions were believed to still be
at a disadvantage vis avis the continued, intense competi-
tion from (non depository) money market mutual funds, a
second piece oflegislation was passed in 1982. The Garn-
St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 author-
ized (in its Title III) the money market deposit account
(MMDA). The MMDA required a minimum balance and
hadrestricted transactions capability, butoffered an unreg-
ulated deposit rate. It was widely available by the end of
1982. On January 5, 1983, so-called Super Now accounts,
with unregulated deposit rates, were permitted. Thus,
effective deregulation of retail transactions deposit rates
occurred sometime between 1980 and 1983, although full
removal of rate ceilings and account minimums on all
types of retail accounts did not occur until 1986.
These Acts had features that also affected the mortgage
markets. Title VofDIDMCA, for example, authorized an
override ofstate usury provisions on loans secured by liens
oneligible residential real estate and made after March 31,
1980. TitleII oftheGarn-St. GermainAct, also preempted
state-imposed restrictions on the execution of the due-on-
sale clause in mortgage contracts. 8
In addition to legislative changes, several important
regulatory changes broadened the types of mortgage in-
struments that could be offered by banks and thrifts. First,
in 1981 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board permitted
thrifts to offer adjustable rate mortgages on a wide-
spread basis.9 Since regulation and the conventions ofthe
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secondary markets have strongly influenced the types of
mortgages that lenders have issued ever since the 1930s,
this change inregulationmeans thatpriorto 1981itis likely
that well over 95 percent of all residential mortgages
issued were conventional, fixed-rate, self-amortizing in-
struments, although accurate statistics to support this
observation unfortunately are·not available.
In addition, the technology ofthe mortgage marketplace
was changing during the period of the early 1980s. As a
result of the continued development of the secondary
mortgage market, in particular, newly-originated mort-
gages no longer needed to be funded within the bank or
thrift portfolio. Instead, mortgages could be used to create
mortgage-backed securities which could then be sold to a
variety ofinstitutional and private investors. This process,
known as securitization, was facilitated by govemment-
backedmortgage agencies whichprovidedcreditenhance-
ment in the form of principal and interest guarantees to
investors in the securities. Development of the secondary
mortgage market was particularly rapid in the early 1980s.
The volume of contracted mortgage commitments of the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), for
example, grew from about $7 billion in 1981 to almost $33
billion in 1983.
Effects on the Housing Market
These legislative reforms and market developments had
the effect of facilitating better matching of the needs of
demanders and suppliers of mortgage credit over the
interest rate cycle, and as a result, affected most of the
interest rate/housing channels discussed earlier. First, the
deregulation ofdeposit rates removed the primary cause of
financial disintermediation. Deposit rate flexibility ena-
bledbanks and thrifts to price their deposits more competi-
tively with non-deposit investments. Thus, when general
interest rates rise in the current regulatory environment,
there need be no tendency for depositorfunds to flow outof
financial intermediaries into investments in the primary
securities markets.10This presumably has had the effect of
making mortgage supply less cyclically-sensitive.
Second, the continued development of secondary mort-
gage markets also helped to make mortgage supply less
cyclical. A mortgage lender having difficulty attracting
funds can now originate a qualified mortgage, and sell it
into a very liquid secondary market.
Third, the availability of the adjustable rate mortgage
after April 1981 likely affected the channel relating to the
affordability constraint. The ARM generally has initial
7In summary, there are a number of reasons to expect a
weakening ofthe linkage between interest rates and hous-
ing investment activity at some point in the early 1980s.
The linkage likely has weakened along with the weakening
ofthe secondary channels ofinfluence-affordability and
credit scoring constraints, financial disintermediation ef-
fects, and other mortgage instrumentation constraints.
Chart 2
ARMs and Interest Rates
payments that are lowerthan those offixed rate mortgages,
making any given payment-to-income test less binding. In
addition, the flexibility of the instrument's payment struc-
ture (allowing such things as low buy-in or "teaser" rates,
negative amortization, and so on) can be used to tailor the
instrument to borrower needs over the business cycle.
This, too, should have the effect of better insulating
mortgage supply conditions from interest rate cycles.
The adjustable rate mortgage may be influential in
another way, as well. It can be shown that borrowers may
preferARMs over fixed rate instruments when they believe
that their own income is likely to fluctuate with future
interest rate movements. Elimination in 1981 of restric-
tions on ARMs therefore likely made the mortgage market
more "complete"; that is, it may now be better able to
efficiently match borrowers' and lenders' needs as they
vary over the business cycle, reducing the cyclical linkage
among interest rates, mortgage credit, and housing in-
vestment. 11
As Chart 2 illustrates, the share of ARMs in new
mortgages varies with the interest rate cycle. The chart
plots the deviations in interest rates from a simple linear
time trend, and the share of new mortgages issued as
adjustable rate instruments. When interestrates rise above
their trend, the ARM share also rises, consistent with the
notion that the ARM instrument does, indeed, help to

















III. The Interest Rate Link: The Empirical Record
In this section, the available data are examined to
determine whether the changes in the early 1980s actually
diminished the strength of the relationship between inter-
est rates and housing. The empirical approach employs
simple, time-series models estimated using data from the
period from 1960 to 1989. In this section, Itest for changes
in the effect of interest rates on housing starts and for
changes in the effect ofinterest rates on fund flows to insti-
tutional housing lenders (thrifts and banks). The model
presented above permits analysis of the effect on housing
ofone-time disturbances or "shocks" to interest rates and
comparison of the size of this effect in the pre- and post-
deregulation periods. My interest in testing the effects on
housing starts follows directly from the hypothesis that
positive disturbances to interest rates typically have de-
pressed housing demand and, thereby, housing invest-
ment. My interest in studying the effectofinterest rates on
8
fund flows is to determine whether mortgage-supply phe-
nomena were, in fact, a channel of influence.'
The Basic Model
The models estimated in this section use simple, vector
autoregression (VAR) systems. These VAR models em-
ploy generalizedtime-series equations to identify dynamic
relationships among the variables ofinterest. Such models
are particularly appropriate in this application because
they permit exploration of shocks and other dynamic inter-
actions among the variables. In addition, their atheoretical
structure is desirable in this context because we are inter-
ested in changes in linkages across periods, rather than
testing a particular model specification.
The estimated VAR equation systems involve the cur-
rent valueofeach variable of interest regressed on lagged
values ofitself and every other variable in the system. In a
Economic Review / Summer 1990two variable (X and Y) system, for example, the estimated
equations would be:
n n
Xt = C1 + i~laliXt-l + i~lbli Yt - 1 + elt (5)
n n
Yt = C2 + i~la2i X t - 1 + i~lb2i Yt - 1 + e2t (6)
where a, b, and Care estimated coefficients and nis the lag
length employed.
In the empirical work below, equations similar to those
in (5) and (6) are estimated using monthly data on interest
rates and various housing-related variables. Acomparison
of the relationships estimated for the period prior to
deregulation with those for the period afterward can detect
changes in the interest rate/housing linkage. For the pur-
poses ofthe analysis below, the pre-deregulation period is
assumed to span from 1960 to 1982, and the post-deregula-
tion period extends from 1983 to 1989,12
The linkages between the interest rate variables on the
one hand, and housing starts or funds flows, on the other,
are explored in a series ofsimple VARs, rather than in one
large VAR system, which would take into account all the
interrelationships among these variables. As a practical
matter, the paucity ofdata in the post-deregulation period
constrains the size of the VARs that may be employed.
Thus, housing starts and funds flows are studied one at a
time, paired with the interest rate variable(s).13
Several statistical tests are presented to demonstrate the
changes in the interest rate/housing linkage. First, aChow
test is used to compare the VAR systems for the pre-
deregulation period with those estimated over the subse-
quentperiod to determine whether the estimatedequations
differ significantly between the two estimation periods .14
Second, the share of the total observed variation in
housing starts "explained" by interest rate variation is
examined for the two periods. While such "variance de-
composition" exercises cannotreveal changes in statistical
"causality" with great precision, changes in the contribu-
tion of interest rates to the variance in statts between the
two periods is suggestive of a change in the underlying
structure of the housing market. 15
Finally, impulse response functions are estimated and
presented for both the pre- and post-deregulation periods.
These relationships project the effects into future periods
ofan hypothetical, one standarddeviation shock in interest
rates. Unlike a simple comparison of coefficients, the
impulse response functions incorporate all direct and
feedback effects. They provide a graphical summary of
interest rate effects before and after deregulation.
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The Data
The models reported in this paper are all two- or three-
variable VARs that use monthly data and a 12-period lag
structure on all variables. The interest rate (TBILLS)
variable employed is the short-term interest rate, measured
by the 90-day Treasury bill yield. In addition, in some of
the VARs reported below, the difference between the short-
and long-term interest rate (LNGMSHRT) is also in-
cluded as a proxy for the effects on the yield curve that
would accompany achange in long-term inflation expecta-
tions. As discussed in Section II, whether an increase in
interest rates is due to the real rate or inflationexpectations
may have different effects. The long rate used is the AAA
corporate bond yield. 16
Housing starts data (rather than data on housing invest-
ment) are employed in this study to permit amonthly time
frame for analysis and to avoid the arbitrary valuation
assumptions that must be made to calculate housing in-
vestment flows. The housing starts variable (STARTS) is
seasonally adjusted. The aggregate offunds flows to thrifts
and commercial banks (FUNDTOT) is measured as net
changes in total share balances and total deposits.
Empirical Results
The results presented first shed light on the hypothesis
that changes in mortgage instrumentation and other factors
have relaxed the "affordability" constraint, thereby re-
ducing the "direct" effect of interest rate cycles on hous-
ing starts.
Housing Starts and Interest Rates
Housing start relationships are studied using two simple
VAR systems, compared over two periods. In the first
VAR, the only interest rate variable is the Treasury
bill rate. In the second, both the Treasury bill rate and
the difference between the long rate and the short rate
are used.
Chow tests suggest that in both VARs, the results from
the two periods are significantly different at a confidence
level ofover 90 percent. In addition, the pattern of coeffi-
cients (for brevity, not shown here) in both models suggests
that the relationship between interest rates and housing
starts has changed significantly since 1983.
Table 1presents the variance decomposition obtained
from the two models for both time periods. As would be
expected if the interest rate channel had weakened in the
later period, the contribution of interest rates to the total





10 Economic ..~.,,'~.., / SummerFederal Reserve Bank ofSan Franciscoare consistent with the hypothesis that disintermediation
has declined in the sense that fund flows are less sensitive
to interest rate shocks in the post-82 period. This is
confirmed more formally by a Chow test which finds the
estimated relationship for the two periods to be signifi-
cantly different at better than the 90 percent level.
The impulse response functions graphed in Chart 4
depict the effects of these changes. Prior to 1983, a one
standard deviation increase in the Treasury bill rate re-
sultedin adecline in netfund flows to banks andthrifts that
began aboutthreemonths after the shock, and extended for
seven oreight months. In the period after 1982, an effectof
this scale appears to be absent.
In the third and fourth columns ofTable 2, the variance
decomposition results from the VARs linking housing
starts to fund flows and interest rates are reported. In this
case, the impact on housing starts of a shock to interest
rates declines as expected. The impact of fund flows in-
creases, suggesting that traditional intermediaries, ifany-
thing, playa more important role in the post-82 period.
However, this may simply be aresult ofhigher variance in
fund flows after 1982. For this reason, it is important to
inspect the impulse response function. The change in the
coefficients estimated in the two periods is significant here
as well, as confirmed by a Chow test.
In panels A and B of Chart 5, the effects of positive
shocks to fund flows and Treasury bills are depicted for the
pre-1983 and post-1982 periods, respectively. As in the
simpler VARs discussed above, .a depressing effect ·on
housing starts of shocks to the Treasury bill rate is ob-
served in the pre-1983 period. A one-standard deviation
shock results in a 70 thousand unit decline in housing
starts. In this model, the additional funds flow variable
also has an effect on starts; a shock to fund flows does
appear to stimulate starts, suggesting that during this
period housing was linked to the funding capability ofthe
traditional housing lenders.
Panel Bof Chart 5 suggests that both effects are much
less pronounced in the post-1983 period. This finding is
consistent with the notion that not only is housing less
sensitive to interestrates directly, but also that the supply
of funds to housing from other sources (via the mortgage
securities market, for example) has increased.
Shock in
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12 Economic Review / Summer 1990IV. Conclusions and Policy Implications
The potencyofthe interestrate/honsing linkage appears
to have changed significantly in the period following
extensive financial deregulation in the early 1980s. In this
paper, simple time series statistical models were used to
measure the changes in the strength ofthis linkage, and to
explore the possible causes ofthe changes.
The available data allow demonstration of a strong
association in time between the changes in this linkage and
changes in the regulation ofmortgage lending institutions.
The data also allow testing ofthe independent causal link-
age between housing starts and fund flows into traditional
mortgage lenders. The results, therefore, are consistent
withlinkages associated with disintermediationprocesses,
affordability constraints, mortgage instrumentation re-
strictions, and growth of secondary markets.
Less important than the precise linkage, however, is the
fact that the strength of the link appears to have weakened
considerably in the post-82 period. This change has the
greatest import for investors, builders and owners of
housing in the United States, since it means that the
housing sector is less likely to be buffeted severely during
periods of economic policy manipulation.
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
The housing market appears to be functioning at alevel
ofhousing production of about 1.6 million units per year;
this puts the market in asteadierenvironment that is below
the peaks of earlier cycles, but is also well above the
troughs. In such an environment, participants in the hous-
ing market can direct theirresources to responding to other
planning parameters, such as local economic and demo-
graphic conditions.
The weakening of the interest rate link to the housing
cycle also may be important from the standpoint of the
conduct of national economic policy. With a weaker link
between interest rates and housing, national output levels
become less sensitive to interest rate disturbances, at
least on a cyclical basis. This is a desirable prospect, of
course, to those economists who would prefer to see the
economy buffered against most macroeconomic disturb-
ances, which they view as originating from the misman-
agement of monetary aggregates and interest rates. If, on
the other hand, manipulation of aggregate real output
levels is a key element of effective national economic
policy, the increased insulation of the housing sector may
make such management more difficult.
13NOTES
1. For example, the standard deviation of housing starts
from its trend from 1962 to the present has been one-fifth
of its mean level, versus only one-twentieth for real GNP.
2. R. E. Hall and J. B. Taylor, Macroeconomics (New York:
W. W. Norton & Company), 1986, p. 203.
3. The other two components are nonresidential fixed in-
vestment (purchases of new plant and equipment by busi-
nesses) and inventory investment (changes in stocks of
goods produced but not yet purchased).
4. See P. K. Clark, "Investment in the 1970s: Theory,
Performance and Prediction," Brookings Papers on Eco-
nomic Activity, Washington, D.C., 1979, pp. 73-113.
5. The role of residential investment in business cycles
is discussed along these lines in Dornbusch and Fis-
cher, Macroeconomics, New York: McGraw-Hili, 1987,
pp.317-326.
6. There are several aspects of U.S. tax policy that make
the capital gains tax rate less than the tax rate on "ordi-
nary" income. First, the statutory rate on realized, long-
term capital gains historically has been lowerthan the rate
on ordinary income. Thus, although the tax reforms of
1986 made these rates the same, over most of the period
covered in this paper, there was asignificantly lower long-
term capital gains rate. Second, capital gains generally
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As a practical matter, the results are relatively insensitive
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Economic Review / Summer 1990